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Auctions as a Vehicle to Reduce Airport Delays
and Achieve Value Capture
Jeffrey P. Cohen, Cletus C. Coughlin, and Lesli S. Ott
Congestion at airports imposes large costs on airlines and their passengers. A key reason for con-
gestion is that an airline schedules its flights without regard to the costs imposed on other airlines
and their passengers. As a result, during some time intervals, airlines schedule more flights to and
from an airport than that airport can accommodate and flights are delayed. This paper explores how
a specific market-based proposal by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which includes
the use of auctions to determine the right to arrive or depart in a specific time interval at airports
in the New York City area, might be used as part of a strategy to mitigate delays and congestion.
By explaining the underlying economic theory and key arguments with minimal technical jargon,
the paper allows those with little formal training in economics to understand the fundamental
issues associated with the FAA’s controversial proposal. Moreover, the basics of the proposed
auction process, known as a combinatorial auction, and value capture are also explained. 
(JEL R41, R48, L93)
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flights arrived on time.2 Thus, more than three
of every ten flights arrived 15 or more minutes
past their scheduled arrival time.
Many factors, such as weather and mechanical
problems, determine an airport’s on-time perform-
ance. This paper focuses on the delays and con-
gestion associated with the scheduling of flight
arrivals and departures. Generally speaking, an
airline schedules its flights without regard to the
costs it imposes on other airlines and their passen-
gers. When airlines schedule more flights to and
from an airport than that airport can accommodate,
flights are delayed. These delays impose large
costs on the airlines themselves and, ultimately,
on passengers. With respect to New York City area
airports, Levine (2009) cites an estimate that these
airports are involved in three-quarters of conges-
tion delay in the entire U.S. system. We explore
I
n rankings of on-time arrivals and depar-
tures for major airports, New York City
area airports fare poorly. For 32 major air-
ports during 2008, the on-time arrivals of
Newark Liberty International Airport (Newark)
ranked 32nd, LaGuardia Airport (LaGuardia)
ranked 31st, and John F. Kennedy International
Airport (Kennedy) ranked 29th.1 Their on-time
arrival percentages—Newark’s 62 percent,
LaGuardia’s 63 percent, and Kennedy’s 69 per-
cent—revealed that fewer than seven of every ten
1 Using on-time departure data provides a similar picture. For 2008
Kennedy ranked 26th, LaGuardia ranked 28th, and Newark ranked
31st. See “Airline On-Time Statistics” 
(www.bts.gov/xml/ontimesummarystatistics/src/index.xml).
2 These on-time arrival statistics likely understate the extent of the
problem. Because a late arrival is one landing 15 minutes past its
scheduled arrival time, airlines can increase their on-time percent-
ages by increasing the scheduled flight time. See Whalen et al. (2007).
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auctions to determine the right to arrive or depart
in a specific interval of time, might be used as part
of a strategy to mitigate delays and congestion.
The focus on specific time intervals reflects
the fact that the demand for passenger travel
varies throughout a day. It is this variability that
increases the odds that the demand for takeoff
and landing slots at certain times during the day
will exceed an airport’s capacity. Takeoff and land-
ing fees that do not vary throughout the course
of a day are simply too low to efficiently allocate
the scarce good of the right to land or depart
during some time intervals. Armed with this
economic insight and eager to solve the obvious
congestion problem, many economists have sug-
gested using a market-based approach.3
On September 16, 2008, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) announced its intention to
implement a market-based approach by auction-
ing a limited number of slots at Newark, LaGuardia,
and Kennedy airports starting on January 12,
2009.4 Ideally, the auctions would ensure that the
slots would be purchased by airlines placing the
highest value on those slots. In addition, the FAA
stated that the proceeds from the auctions would
be spent on New York City area projects to mitigate
congestion and delay.5 Consequently, in a cost-
effective way, the FAA hoped to achieve its goals:
reduce some congestion directly and immediately
and generate financing for additional projects to
reduce congestion and delay in the future.
Despite the potential for the FAA’s approach
to alleviate delays, numerous parties voiced
strong opposition against it—including the Air
Transport Association of America (ATA), the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ),
and legislators.6 In mid-December 2008 a three-
judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the slot
auction could not be held until a federal court
ruled on the objections raised by the ATA and
the New York airport officials.7 Effectively, the
court decision shifted the question of whether to
move forward with the auctions from the Bush
administration to the Obama administration. Most
recently, in spring 2009, the U.S. Department of
Transportation announced the cancellation of
the slot auctions.8
Despite the lack of immediate public-policy
relevance, an examination of the FAA’s proposal
is still of much value because of the important
economic issue that it addresses and the interest-
ing economic and political arguments associated
with it. Our primary goal here is to make the theory
and the arguments, especially those relying on
economics, accessible to those with little formal
training in economics. We begin by identifying
insights from economic theory that are relevant
to dealing with congestion. Next, we summarize
the FAA’s proposal and then identify the key fea-
tures of the proposed auction. With economic
theory and the proposal as background, we then
turn to the arguments for and against the FAA’s
proposal.
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3 See Whalen et al. (2007) for a discussion of failed policies that
have attempted to reduce delays at LaGuardia, Kennedy, O’Hare,
and Washington’s Reagan National Airport.
4 The actual use of auctions in the context of airports would be novel;
however, auctions have been used in other settings, such as air-
waves and pollution rights. As discussed by Tietenberg (2000), the
approach can be viewed as a property-rights approach. A market
is created by defining a property right and then allowing the right
to be traded. Many issues immediately arise, one of which is who
is given the right initially. A government agency might hold the
right initially and then auction it off or it might allocate the right
based on some history of activity or some other way. Concerning
greenhouse gas emissions, the initial allocation is a key component
of a cap-and-trade program. As discussed in The Economist (2009),
the possible use of auctions for reducing emissions in the United
States is controversial.
5 Morrison and Winston (2008) provide suggestive evidence support-
ing such spending. They found that $1 of FAA spending reduced
the costs of delay to airport users by $2.13 and that this spending
could generate even larger benefits if it were allocated toward air-
ports with the greatest delays.
6 The ATA, which represents the nation’s largest airlines, filed a
lawsuit to stop the auctions, arguing that the government lacked
the legal authority to impose the auctions. The Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, which runs all three airports, supported
the ATA. Senator Charles Schumer from New York characterized
the proposed auctions as insanity and argued: “Auctions have
never been tried and were hatched by a handful of ivory-tower
types in the administration” (see Caterinicchia, 2008).
7 See Holland (2008).
8 See Bomkamp (2009).CONGESTION AT AIRPORTS:
SOME BASIC ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES
Congestion problems arise at airports when
the flight activity scheduled by more than one
airline for a period of time cannot be accommo-
dated in that time frame and delays occur. Conges  -
tion at airports is an example of what economists
term a “negative externality.” A negative external-
ity occurs when an individual consumer or firm
making a decision does not have to pay the full
cost of the decision.9 As a result, some costs are
forced on other consumers and firms. The shifting
of costs onto others means that social costs (i.e.,
the private costs plus the costs forced on others)
exceed the private costs. When the decisionmaker
does not bear the full costs, then the decision-
maker will engage in too much of the activity.
Economic Efficiency and Optimal
Congestion
For our illustration, we focus on the schedul-
ing of flights by airlines.10 When we use the term
scheduled, we also assume flown. Thus, the costs
and benefits identified below are for scheduled
flights that occur. In Figure 1, the quantity of
flights is on the horizontal axis, while a measure
of the value (price) of a scheduled flight is on the
vertical axis. Private marginal cost, MCP, measures
the cost of an additional flight. For a small number
of flights, private marginal cost is drawn as a hori-
zontal line indicating the same incremental cost
of additional flights. Eventually, private marginal
cost is positively sloped, suggesting that additional
flights become increasingly costly. In other words,
the costs borne by the scheduling airline increase
after the number of flights reaches QC. Meanwhile,
social marginal cost, MCS, includes private mar-
ginal cost plus the cost forced on other airlines
when a specific airline schedules an additional
Cohen, Coughlin, Ott
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The Efficient Quantity of Flights: Optimal Congestion
9 Congestion is unlikely to be a problem at an airport dominated by
one airline. Any congestion from that airline will delay primarily
its own flights and, thus, the costs are borne by that airline. The
airline will consider the effect of scheduling an additional flight
on the revenues and expenses of its other existing flights, as well
as the revenues and expenses of the additional flight.
10 See Cohen and Coughlin (2003) for a similar discussion from the
perspective of consumers.flight. These latter costs are congestion costs,
which are simply the difference between social
and private marginal cost. In Figure 1, for a small
number of flights the social and private marginal
cost curves coincide: This reflects an absence of
congestion costs. As the number of flights increases
beyond QC, however, congestion occurs and social
marginal cost lies above private marginal cost.
Airlines schedule flights to maximize their
profits. The marginal benefit curve, which ulti-
mately hinges on consumer demand, reflects the
benefits (i.e., revenues) that the airline generates
from a flight. These additional benefits decline
as the number of scheduled flights increases.11
As a result, the number of scheduled flights in
an unregulated, competitive market will be QP.12
From society’s point of view, QP is an exces-
sive number of flights because at this quantity of
flights social marginal cost exceeds marginal ben-
efit. Ideally, QS should be the number of sched-
uled flights because, for a quantity of flights less
than QS, the marginal benefits for scheduling addi-
tional flights exceed marginal social cost. Beyond
QS, marginal benefits are less than marginal social
costs. Note that some congestion exists at QS, so
the optimal level of congestion is not zero, but
rather some positive amount. The issue for policy-
makers is how to reduce the number of flights
from QP to QS.13
One option is to allow no more than a given
number of landings and departures in a specific
period.14 In Figure 1, this means reducing the
quantity of flights to QS.15 Quantity-based regu-
lation would limit the number of flights to this
level. An important issue involves deciding who
is allowed to use the scarce arrival and departure
slots. This can be done by maintaining the exist-
ing flight shares of airlines before the reductions,
but this hinders potential new entrants and might
cause some airlines to retain slots that they value
less than other airlines might value them. Also,
because the slots are valuable, the use of this
option means that the government generates none
of the potential revenue. Securing such revenue
is part of a process termed “value capture.” For  -
going this revenue might make the financing of
future airport expansions reliant on less-efficient
options, such as other taxes. See the boxed insert
for a detailed discussion of the revenue-raising
technique of value capture.
To overcome the likely inefficiency of simply
continuing the existing flight shares, two market-
based measures of allocating slots have been pro-
posed, one relying on a price-setting mechanism
and the other on a quantity-setting mechanism.
Both measures can yield identical results, but
considerations, such as uncertainty involving
demand or supply and the cost of implementation,
might lead to the superiority of one measure.
A price-setting mechanism, known as “con-
gestion pricing,” varies landing fees by time of day.
With this approach regulators would set prices
for landings and takeoffs that would yield the
efficient level of output at the airport. In light of
the excess demand for arrival and departure slots
at certain times of the day, the goal of congestion
pricing is to shift some demand during the most
congested periods of the day to times when capac-
ity is readily available (i.e., periods of excess
supply). Rather than have fees that do not vary
over the course of a day, access fees would be
higher during peak travel hours to induce airlines
to shift some operations from the peak travel hours
to nonpeak travel hours. In Figure 1, a congestion
tax equal to AD (or the difference between PS and
PP) per flight would induce airlines to reduce
scheduled flights from QP to QS.
Auctions are another market-based mechanism
to mitigate the adverse effects of congestion and
11 This is analogous to the fact that lower airline fares are associated
with an increase in quantity demanded on the part of airline 
passengers.
12 The welfare loss stemming from the excessive number of flights is
the area ABC in Figure 1.
13 Congestion might be reduced by increasing capacity via adding
runways and improving the air traffic control system, but these
approaches do not deal with the externality problem. See Cohen
and Coughlin (2003) for an introduction to the economics of airport
expansions. A counterintuitive proposal for dealing with congestion
has been highlighted by Dubner (2009). Closing LaGuardia would
free up air space and allow Newark and Kennedy to operate more
efficiently and at a higher capacity.
14 Safety considerations also affect the actual number of arrivals and
departures that an airport can handle.
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15 A similar option mentioned in Whalen et al. (2007) is to allow the
airlines to negotiate with each other to reach a solution. Such an
option is likely flawed because the interests of potential competitors
and consumers would not be adequately served.allocate scarce arrival and departure capacity
efficiently. Auctions are viewed as a quantity-
setting mechanism. Under this option, property
rights to use the QS slots are sold or leased to the
highest bidders via an auction. The winning bid-
ders would have the right to use the slots for some
specific time period each day for the length of the
contract or sell or lease the right in a secondary
market.16 With a second price auction, airlines
would be induced to bid their true valuation for
the slots, and the resulting payment would extract
nearly the entire “surplus” from the airlines.17
Thus, the auctions lead to the efficient outcome.18
Adding Real-World Complexity
In the preceding example, the regulators were
assumed to know the locations of the marginal
benefit and marginal cost curves with certainty.
A more realistic assumption is one of uncertainty,
which allows for the regulators’ expectations to
differ from what actually occurs. This modifica-
tion can cause the results of price regulation to
differ from quantity regulation. Assume that the
regulators are certain about the locations of the
marginal cost curves but are uncertain about the
location of the marginal benefit curve.19 In
Figure 2 this is represented by a realized marginal
benefit (MBR) curve that lies above the expected
marginal benefit (MBE) curve.20
Cohen, Coughlin, Ott
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Prices Versus Quantity Regulation: Marginal Benefit Uncertainty
16 Another feature of the property right, recommended by Whalen et
al. (2007), is to include a cancellation priority. This would provide
a way to allocate the slots when weather or some other factor tem-
porarily reduced the number of arrivals and takeoffs that could be
handled.
17 In a second price auction, the highest bidder wins but pays a price
equal to the second-highest bid.
18 The economic roots of our discussion can be found in a classic
paper by Weitzman (1974) that compares environmental regulation
using a price (e.g., a tax on pollution emissions) with regulation
using a quantity (e.g., emission standards).
19 This example can be characterized as illustrating regulatory cost
uncertainty. Albeit confusing at first, the reasoning is straightfor-
ward. The benefits of regulation are the benefits of reducing conges-
tion costs, while the costs of regulation are primarily the foregone
travel benefits. Thus, in the example, the regulators are certain
about the private and social (i.e., congestion) costs of airline flights,
but are uncertain about the benefits of flights.
20 See Adar and Griffin (1976) for a discussion of uncertainty with
linear marginal benefit and cost functions.Cohen, Coughlin, Ott
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VALUE CAPTURE: ECONOMIC THEORY
Generally speaking, the use of most types of taxes to fund public projects creates some eco-
nomic inefficiency. For example, a sales tax puts a wedge between the price paid by a buyer and
the price received by a seller. Relative to a situation without a tax (i.e., the price is the same regard-
less of whether you are a buyer or a seller), imposing a tax tends to cause the price paid by buyers
to increase and the price received by sellers to decrease. As a result, some mutually beneficial
exchanges do not occur. Economists refer to the forgone benefits as a “deadweight loss.”
This general result, however, does not hold when the supply curve is fixed at a specific quan-
tity (that is, when supply is perfectly inelastic). Capping the number of slots would produce such
a supply curve. In the accompanying figure, with the price of slots on the vertical axis (Pslot), and
the quantity of slots (Qslot) on the horizontal axis, the supply of slots is drawn as a vertical line at
Q*. In other words, suppose the airport (or the FAA) sets and controls the initial supply of “slots”
by imposing operating limits and distributes these “slots” free of charge to the airlines. As dis-
cussed in the text, the determination of the socially ideal level of slots is far from easy. For the
remainder of this discussion, we assume that Q* is the ideal level of slots. Meanwhile, the demand
for slots is drawn with a negative slope, reflecting that the quantity demanded of this input for
flights increases as its price declines. In other words, airlines will prefer to increase their slots as
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Because the supply of slots is perfectly inelastic, a tax (t) imposed on the owners of these slots
will extract the maximum amount of tax revenue (or value) from the slot holders without distorting
behavior of the “consumers” of slots.1,2 In other words, there is no deadweight loss associated with
this tax. The tax on slots would shift the demand curve downward, from D to D′, by the amount of
the tax. The after-tax price received by sellers of slots would be (P* – t). Tax revenues would be
the amount given by t ￗ Q*.
To maximize revenue, the airport authorities would want to tax until tax revenues are slightly
less than the area of the rectangle P*0Q*A. This scenario implies that the after-tax value of a slot
is only slightly greater than zero, while virtually the entire surplus is captured by the taxing a uthor-
ity. The tax revenues could be used to finance airport operations, maintenance, and/or long-run
airport improvements, and this approach would avoid the need for higher other distortionary taxes. 
One might ask the following question: Instead of going through these steps to generate the high-
est possible amount of tax revenues by extracting the entire surplus, why not have the government
sell these slots or hold a first-price auction? 
There are two reasons. First, a practical problem arises in determining beforehand the position
of the demand curve at different slot prices. In the typical case, the demand curve represents the
airlines’ reservation price. In the present case, it is not feasible to ask the airlines what their reser-
vation price is for a given slot, which is the approach of a first-price auction, because of the incen-
tive for airlines to understate their true valuation. A second-price auction is a plausible alternative
because it is known to induce participants to bid their true valuation. In other words, the second-
price auction organized by the government would be expected to extract the same amount of
revenue from the airlines as a value capture tax on the slot holders in the amount of P*. So a seco nd-
price auction can be used as an equally effective (and efficient) method of value capture.
Second, to auction the slots, the government must rescind operating rights and possibly com-
pensate the current occupants of the slots. We have shown that the government can generate the
same revenues from a second-price auction as from a value capture tax. However, due to political
pressures, the government likely would somehow need to compensate airlines currently holding
the slots after reselling them at auction. As a result, net of these compensation costs, the govern-
ment may actually end up with less revenue if it auctions slots than if it taxes current slot holders.
Thus, from a political perspective, a value capture tax on the current slot holders may be a better
approach to raising revenues than an auction, although the value capture tax may not solve the
congestion problem in the same way as an auction. But, if the government were to reset the maxi-
mum numbers of flights and take back only some of the existing slots and impose a value capture
tax on the remaining slots, this could be at least as effective as auctioning all of the slots in address-
ing congestion. It may even raise more revenues than an auction because fewer flights would have
their slots confiscated and in turn, there would be less need for compensation.
1 See Cohen and Coughlin (2005) for an exposition of the optimal taxation of land, which they assume is also perfectly inelastically
supplied.
2 Similar to landing slot taxation, Tietenberg (2000) discusses the evolution of the current tradable discharge permits system in the
United States. He notes that initially ozone depletion permits were given to pollution-generating firms and, later, these firms were
taxed by the federal government because of the rents generated from the trading of these permits and the desire by Congress to genera te
revenues.The regulators make their decision based on
expectations, so they would impose a tax of AD
per flight if regulating by price and a maximum
number of flights of QQ if regulating by quantity.
Given a tax of AD per flight, the number of sched-
uled flights would be QT. The underlying reason-
ing is as follows: From the perspective of airlines,
the tax of AD causes a parallel upward shift of
their costs. This line, which is not drawn, is the
private marginal cost curve plus the tax of AD.
The intersection of this line with the realized mar-
ginal benefit determines the quantity of scheduled
flights, which as stated previously is QT. Note
that in Figure 2 the length of AD must equal FG.
In this case, the quantity of flights would exceed
the efficient quantity, QS, which is determined by
the intersection of the social marginal cost curve
and the realized marginal benefit curve. On the
other hand, regulation by quantity would lead to
too few flights because QQ would be less than QS.
Thus, neither form of regulation is efficient.
The welfare loss, measured as the deviation
from economic efficiency, associated with price
regulation is represented by the area of triangle
CEF, while the welfare loss associated with quan-
tity regulation is represented by the area of triangle
ABC.21 The preferred regulatory instrument is the
one yielding the smaller welfare loss. As drawn
in Figure 2, the area of triangle CEF is smaller
than the area of triangle ABC, so price regulation
is preferred to quantity regulation. However, we
could have drawn Figure 2 so that quantity regu-
lation is preferred to price regulation. Assuming
straight lines, the flatter the slope of the realized
marginal benefit curve relative to the slope of the
social marginal cost curve, the more likely quantity
regulation will become the preferred approach.22
The preceding example is focused on uncer-
tainty involving the marginal benefit curve. What
happens when the uncertainty is restricted to
social marginal costs? The answer is that price
regulation and quantity regulation generate identi-
cal results—regardless of the slopes of the curves. 23
The preceding discussion ignores the possi-
bility that congestion at an airport depends on
congestion at other airports. Two types of inter-
dependencies—substitutability and complemen-
tarity—exist. In the first case, nearby airports
compete with each other for passengers and cargo,
so that increased traffic at one airport might reduce
the traffic at a nearby airport. On the other hand,
due to the network character of the air transporta-
tion system, airports also provide complemen-
tary services because a takeoff from one airport
requires a landing at another airport. Thus, the
increased use of runway slots at one airport tends
to increase the demand for runway slots at other
airports.
Czerny (2006) focuses on demand comple-
mentarity and compares the welfare effects of
quantity regulation via slot constraints with price
regulation via congestion pricing. His key conclu-
sion is that the demand-related features of the
airline industry increase the attractiveness of using
slot constraints relative to congestion pricing.
With congestion pricing airport usage is uncer-
tain, and demand complementarity causes this
demand uncertainty to propagate from one airport
to another. Slot constraints can eliminate this
propagation and can prevent the excessive use of
runways and, thus, generate a preferred solution.
In contrast to Czerny (2006), Brueckner (2009)
ignores both demand uncertainty and network
externalities. He focuses on one airport served
by more than one airline and allows the number
of flights to differ across airlines. In his model,
an individual airline accounts for the congestion
costs that it imposes on itself (i.e., the airline
internalizes congestion). He explores two price-
based regimes and two quantity-based regimes.
Under a price-based regime, the airport author-
ity announces a charge per flight for airlines to
use a congested airport. The airlines then decide
Cohen, Coughlin, Ott
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21 The welfare loss associated with price regulation can be viewed
in the following way: For each flight in excess of QS, marginal
costs exceed marginal benefits. The triangle CEF measures the net
total cost of these excessive flights. For quantity regulation, too
few flights are scheduled because at QQ marginal benefits exceed
marginal costs. The triangle ABC measures the net total benefits
that are forgone by not having QS flights.
22 This general result is not altered when the realized marginal cost
curve lies to the right of the expected marginal cost curve.
23 An assumption underlying the preceding analysis is that the
uncertain benefit and costs functions are independent. Assuming
a positive (negative) correlation of benefits and costs, Stavins
(1996) finds that regulation by quantity (price) is likely preferred
to regulation by price (quantity).the number of flights. Two approaches are possi-
ble for the setting of prices. One approach entails
charges that can differ across airlines, while the
second approach entails an identical charge for
each flight regardless of the airline. Under the first
approach, assuming slot charges are set correctly,
it is possible to produce the social optimum. Prices
must vary across airlines because of the combi-
nation of different sizes of airlines with the fact
that an airline takes into consideration the con-
gestion it imposes on itself. Moreover, assuming
two carriers, the larger carrier pays a lower con-
gestion charge than the smaller carrier.24
Turning to the quantity-based regimes, the
airport authority must begin by announcing a
fixed volume of flights. The fixed (i.e., socially
optimal) number of slots can be allocated either
by (i) distributing the slots free of charge and
allowing carriers to make adjustments through
trading or (ii) auctioning the slots. Regardless of
the allocation mechanism, the quantity-based
regimes can produce a socially optimal result.
This result is an illustration of the Coase (1960)
theorem. When trade in an externality is possi-
ble and no (or sufficiently low) transaction costs
exist, then an efficient outcome will occur regard-
less of the initial allocation of property rights.25
In sum, the scarcity associated with slot
capacity can be addressed by having airplanes
and travelers wait, politically deciding winners
and losers, or by pricing the scarcity via a market
mechanism. Economists tend to prefer the third
option because of its efficiency properties. Relative
to government decisions, the market mechanism
allows for a speedier response to market changes.
Moreover, the results based on economic theory
applied to airport usage provide a justification
for using quantity regulation for runway usage.
We now turn to the details of the FAA’s plan and
then the objections that have been raised.
DETAILS OF THE FAA’S 
CONGESTION MANAGEMENT PLAN
On October 18, 2008, the FAA published its
final rules concerning congestion management
for LaGuardia, Kennedy, and Newark airports.26
The FAA identified two primary methods to
alleviate congestion. First, the current cap of 81
on the number of hourly takeoff and landing slot
operations available at Kennedy and Newark air-
ports during peak hours was extended and the
number of peak hourly slot operations allowed
at LaGuardia was reduced from 75 to 71.27,28
Second, five consecutive annual slot auctions for
a small number of slots at each airport (approxi-
mately 2 percent per year) would occur so that,
in the face of the hourly caps on arrivals/depar-
tures, individual air carriers could attempt to
increase their slot holdings through competitive
bidding.29 The funds collected from the slot auc-
tions would be used to further mitigate congestion
in the New York City area.30
The reduction in the total number of slots
available at LaGuardia would have required a slot
reallocation among operating airlines. Accord  -
ing to its final rule, the FAA would have deter-
mined the structure of this reallocation. Viewing
the slot reallocation at LaGuardia as integral for
congestion management, the FAA would have
Cohen, Coughlin, Ott
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24 This result occurs because the larger carrier (i.e., the one with
more flights) internalizes more of the congestion damage from its
operation of an additional flight than does the smaller carrier. In
this case, the common charge will penalize the larger (smaller)
carrier too much (little) for the congestion it causes, resulting in the
flight volume for the larger (smaller) carrier being too small (large).
25 Transaction costs as well as strategic behavior can prevent the
parties involved from reaching an agreement that is efficient. In
addition, there are other considerations that could produce a pref-
erence for one allocation method over the other. For those airlines
allocated slots free of charge, the receipt of such a valuable asset
free of charge would be especially attractive. On the other hand,
the airport authority would be forgoing revenue that could be used
to improve the airport and the air transportation system.
26 The final rules can be found at www.fly.faa.gov/ecvrs/circulars/
FR_JFK_and_EWR_final_rule_101008.pdf and
www.fly.faa.gov/ecvrs/circulars/FR_LGA_Final_Rule_101008.pdf.
27 The caps at Kennedy and Newark were originally imposed in the
first half of 2008. Operational caps at all three airports are in effect
from 6 a.m. until 9:59 p.m. each day.
28 The FAA estimated that the new operational cap at LaGuardia
would improve flight delays there by 41 percent. See page 60574
of the final rule for La Guardia (Federal Register, 2008b).
29 A “slot,” as defined by the FAA, is the right to land or depart dur-
ing a 30-minute window.
30 The FAA estimated the amount of net benefit from the LaGuardia
slot auction would be $65.4 million. See page 60595 of the final
rule for LaGuardia (Federal Register, 2008b).required the same structured slot reallocation at
Kennedy and Newark airports as well.
The terms of the slot reallocations were as
follows: The FAA planned to grandfather 85 per-
cent of total slots to existing slot holders, perma-
nently retire 5 percent, and award the last 10
percent in increments over 5 consecutive years
to the winners of annual slot auctions. The FAA
would have allowed each air carrier to choose
half of the 15 percent of current slots they were
to surrender. The FAA would have decided the
remainder to ensure that slots from every peak
hour of the day were available both for permanent
retirement and annual auction. In exchange for
the terms of the slot reallocations, the FAA would
have granted to each airline 10-year slot lease
rights to all slots in its new allocation.31
Though the FAA intended to hold only one
slot auction per year, it recognized that increased
competition coupled with the operational caps
might leave some airlines with fewer slots than
desired after the first slot auction had taken
place.32,33 Therefore, a secondary market by which
air carriers could buy and sell slots among them-
selves, subject to FAA oversight, was to be encour-
aged after the first slot auction was completed.
Secondary market operations were to be allowed
not only for slots won via the auction process
but for all slots.34,35
The FAA’s intention was that the secondary
market for slots would grow and be sufficient to
ensure an efficient allocation of slots long after the
current congestion management rule expired in
2019. In other words, each slot would be obtained
by the air carrier that valued it most. For some,
maximizing a slot’s potential would have meant
using larger planes to transport more passengers
at a given time. For others, it would have meant
subleasing the slot if the gains from the sublease
would have been greater than the marginal benefit
from using it for their own business operations.
In both scenarios, congestion would have been
mitigated and travelers would have benefitted.
DETAILS OF THE DESIGN OF
THE FIRST FAA SLOT AUCTION
According to the final rules, the FAA’s first
slot auction would have offered the lease rights to
at least 24 takeoff and landing slots at LaGuardia
and approximately 18 slots each at Kennedy and
Newark.36,37 While these slot auctions were con-
sidered by the FAA to be integral to their long-term
congestion management plans, the overall design
of the slot auctions was a critical factor for success.
The design of any successful commercial
auction must incorporate the following three
features: (i) Its format must be well suited to the
characteristics of the goods being auctioned; (ii)
it must allow winners to be determined both
quickly and fairly; and (iii) it must generate final
prices that reflect a good’s true economic value.
We will now examine how the FAA’s proposed
slot auction design addressed these concerns.
Combinatorial Auctions
That an even number of slots at each airport
would have been auctioned is not by chance.38
31 Though some disagree, the FAA states that up to this point no
carrier has held a proprietary right to any slot, and that they have
held the right to withdraw slots from carriers at any time. See
page 60574 of the final rule for LaGuardia (Federal Register, 2008b).
32 As noted earlier, the FAA would have held five annual slot auc-
tions. This is the number of years it deemed sufficient for firmly
establishing slot prices given its decision to hold only one auction
per year.
33 It is worth noting that, in some cases, the first auction may have
actually left some airlines with more slots than desired given the
newly established market values associated with them.
34 The FAA would also have allowed any air carrier to present slots
for auction during any one of the five official slot auctions. The
airline could have set a minimum price for each slot and retained
all auction proceeds.
35 The FAA planned to provide ongoing support for this secondary
market. It would have allowed air carriers to post available and
desired slot subleases on its website, and it would have made slot
transactions transparent by posting their values after a sale. It would
also have monitored the secondary market for any anticompetitive
behavior. Each airline would have retained all monetary gains from
these transactions.
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36 See page 60547 of the FAA’s final rule for Kennedy and Newark
(Federal Register, 2008a).
37 The four subsequent auctions were to offer at least 22 slots at
LaGuardia and at least 18 at Kennedy and Newark.
38 That the overall number of slots to be auctioned was small was
also not by chance. The forced reallocation of a relatively small
number of flights was also designed to cause as little disturbance
as possible to overall airport/airline operations.Takeoff and landing slots are seen as complemen-
tary goods by most would-be auction participants.
Understandably, in most circumstances an airline
would want to own the right to a takeoff slot if
and only if it also had the right to a subsequent
landing slot at that same airport (i.e., it needs the
ability to conduct a round trip). Therefore, if
bidders could bid for multiple slots, they would
be more likely to express their true valuation for
them—as some slots would be valued more as one
of a pair. Consequently, the FAA had determined
that the first slot auction would have been con-
ducted as a combinatorial auction where partici-
pants may bid on combinations of slots rather than
being restricted to bidding for single slots only.39
Had the auction been designed as strictly for
single items, air carriers likely would have incor-
porated into their bidding strategy the possibility
of a worse situation should they win only one slot
when a pair was needed.40 One can easily see how
this could lead to distorted bidding for slots to
hedge against that outcome. Moreover, a distorted
valuation of slots in the primary market would
likely lead to price distortion, and therefore inef-
ficiencies, in the larger secondary slot market as
well—an outcome the FAA wanted to avoid.
Combinatorial auctions are not without their
drawbacks, however. While theory has shown
this auction type as the best way of auctioning
complementary goods, real-world combinatorial
auctions are rare. Even with modern computing,
determining the winner of a combinatorial auction
within a realistic amount of time can be difficult.
As we will see, the mathematics underlying com-
binations is the culprit.
Combinatorial auctions are desirable specifi-
cally because participants may fully express their
preferences for any desired combination of goods,
but so too are they problematic for the same rea-
son. For any m items available in a combinatorial
auction, there are 2m–1 possible non-empty bid-
ding combinations. As one can imagine, offering
all but a small number of items for auction would
lead to extreme difficulty for the seller in evalu-
ating each bidding combination.41 For example,
the 24 slots offered in the first LaGuardia slot
auction would have theoretically allowed for 16.8
million subsets of bids per bidder to be placed
and, thus, to be evaluated. Even using today’s
computers the evaluation of 16.8 million subsets
of bids would prove extremely time-consuming.
Finding the solution for a combinatorial auction
in which 2m–1 bids may be submitted is known,
in computational parlance, as an exponential
time problem.42 Given the FAA’s desire to deter-
mine winners within 2 days of the auction’s end,
allowing bidders to submit 16.8 million sets of
bids would have, in fact, made winner determi-
nation impossible.43
For a real-world combinatorial auction, this
winner determination problem requires the auc-
tion to be designed such that a trade-off between
theoretical winner optimization and time is made.
To do this, restrictions on bidding must be in
place. One approach is to require that bids be
made via a particular bidding language. Another
is to set a limit on the number of bids allowed.
The FAA would have done both.44
A “bidding language” is a computer-friendly
language that allows bidders to more succinctly
(computationally speaking) represent their desired
combinations of items. Slot auction participants
would have likely used a computer program into
which bidders would have input their slot prefer-
ences. That program would have then translated
those preferences into the predetermined bidding
language. As such, all bids would have been rep-
resented in a way that a computer algorithm
could have more easily selected the winning
combination.
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39 The auction would also have been sealed-bid and single round.
40 In auction theory, this is known as the exposure problem.
41 Likewise, a bidder can be overwhelmed by the number of bids he
may submit and, therefore, be less likely to participate.
42 Exponential time problems where m is sufficiently large are con-
tained in a class of mathematical problems formally defined as
NP-complete. For a broader discussion of the limitations of modern
computers with respect to NP-complete problems, see Aaronson
(2008).
43 See slide 58 of the “2009 New York Slot Auctions Bidders Seminar”
(FAA, 2008b).
44 For an excellent discussion of the real-world complexities of
combinatorial auctions, including other approaches to the winner
determination problem, see Cramton et al. (2006).To further increase efficiency, the FAA
planned to restrict the maximum number of allow-
able bids to 2,000 per auction participant. While
2,000 is a small fraction of the theoretically pos-
sible 16.8 million, the FAA had determined that
this number of bids would amply allow each
carrier to express all preferences and, therefore,
would not have compromised the fairness of the
results.45 Once all bids were received, the winners
of each slot auction were to be identified by deter-
mining the collection of bids that maximized
total revenue to the FAA subject to the constraints
that no participant could win more than one
combination of slots per airport and that no slot
could be awarded more than once.46
It is reasonable to assume that, when notified,
winners would be expected to remit payment
equal to that of their winning bid. However, for
the slot auctions, this would not have necessarily
been the case. To deter bidding distortions, the
FAA would have required winners to make a final
payment consistent only with the bids of their
strongest competitors.47 This so-called bidder-
optimal core pricing strategy is similar, in auction
theory, to a Vickrey second-price auction where
the winner of a single good pays the price of the
second-highest bid for that good.48 However, given
that the goods in the FAA slot auction could have
been bid for in multiple combinations, in some
cases the Vickrey price may have been too low.
Determining Bidder-Optimal Core Prices
The following figures will demonstrate how,
in the case of multiple bidding, final bidder-
optimal core prices were to be determined.49
Figure 3 shows the bids of five bidders (b1, b2, b3,
b4, and b5) competing for the lease rights to two
slots (A and B). Subject to the constraints that no
slot may be awarded more than once and that total
revenue should be maximized, bidders 1 and 2
are declared the winners with a total bid of 48
for the two slots.
The Vickrey price for slot A is 14 while the
Vickrey price for slot B is 12. However, bidder 3’s
bid of 32 for both A and B together, while still
smaller than the total for the winning bids, exceeds
the 26 that would be realized if winners were
made to pay individual second prices. Therefore,
in terms of a second-price pricing strategy, the
seller will require a payment of at least 32 before
awarding slots A and B. This is because the price
of 32 for the joint A and B slots is the second-
highest price compared with the price bidders 1
and 2 would bid if bidders 1 and 2 were to bid
jointly on slots A and B.
Figure 4 identifies the competitive pricing
core based on the five original bids. This com-
petitive core area represents all prices between
the revenue maximizing outcome of 48 and the
next-best bid of 32. The competitive pricing core
consists of all feasible combinations of prices
that yield an efficient allocation of the two slots.
In the present case, efficiency is directly related to
the willingness to pay by the bidders. Ultimately,
45 Interestingly, this bid limitation may have actually increased auc-
tion participation by carriers as the total number of possible bids
is more manageable even though some may argue that it is theo-
retically limiting.
46 See Amendment 1 of the auction procedures (FAA, 2008a).
47 Should a tie have occurred, it would have been randomly broken
and the declared winner would have paid the full amount of his
or her bid. Also, should only one carrier have bid for a particular
slot, the competitive price for that slot would have been a nominal
reserve price predetermined by the FAA.
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Winners • b1 {A}  = 28
• b2 {B}  = 20
• b3 {AB} = 32
• b4 {A}  = 14
• b5 {B}  = 12
Figure 3
Five Bidders for Two Slots
48 The following discussion relies on core theory. The core can be
viewed as the set of feasible allocations that cannot be improved
upon by trades within a subset of the economy’s consumers. See
Telser (1994).
49 The figures, with some modifications, are from slides 25 through
29 of the auction bidders’ seminar (see FAA, 2008b).their willingness to pay ensures that the final
prices reflect the economic value of the slots.
Given that bidders 1 and 2 are the winners
based on their willingness to pay for the slots, the
competitive pricing core consists of all feasible
combinations of prices that yield at least 32.
Because bidder 1 is willing to pay up to 28 for
slot A, then any price above 28 is not feasible for
bidder 1. In addition, bidder 1 must pay at least
14 because bidder 4 was willing to pay 14. Thus,
the portions of the graph to the right of the vertical
line at 28 and to the left of the vertical line at 14
are eliminated. Similarly, any price above 20 and
below 12 is not feasible for bidder 2, which elimi-
nates the portions of the graph above the horizon-
tal line at 20 and below the horizontal line at 12.
Finally, the competitive pricing core requires that
the winning bidders jointly pay at least 32. The
diagonal line provides the fifth and final side of
the competitive pricing core.
To identify the final price each winning bid-
der may pay, the seller will reduce both bidder 1
and 2’s bids subject to the constraint that jointly
they must pay at least 32. This range of bidder
payments is identified in Figure 5 as the portion
of the diagonal line (i.e., the border of the com-
petitive pricing core) labeled the bidder-optimal
core. The bidder-optimal core is all points of inter-
section between bidder 3’s bid of 32 and bidder
1 and 2’s possible final individual payments.
However, given that there is no unique bidder-
optimal core solution, how does the seller settle
on individual final prices that are fair to both
bidder 1 and bidder 2?
The seller chooses the bidder-optimal core
price closest to the total Vickrey price of 26. As
seen in Figure 6, this is the point on the graph
representing the shortest distance between the
Vickrey prices and the bidder-optimal core.
According to Figure 6, bidder 1 would pay a final
price of 17 while bidder 2 would pay a final price
of 15.
Our elementary discussion suggests that the
use of a combinatorial auction is far from straight-
forward. One of the many issues for policymakers
is whether the likely benefits of such an auction
in terms of economic efficiency and revenues for
congestion-related projects outweigh its likely
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Winning Bidscosts. We now turn our attention to additional
issues raised by the FAA’s proposal.
A DISCUSSION OF ISSUES 
CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL
Numerous issues exist with using any market-
based mechanism to deal with congestion. Our
discussion is focused on economic issues, so we
do not examine whether the FAA has the legal
authority for its proposed rule.50 Many objections
highlight the harm that would be done to some
group. Given that the implementation of any
market-based option would cause some prices and
airline transportation services to change, it is rea-
sonable to expect harm for some groups. Some
concerns stress the harm that would result if the
auction plan were not implemented properly,
while others stress the harm that some would bear
even with proper plan implementation because
they perceive certain features of the plan as unnec-
essary and counterproductive.
To date, auctions and congestion pricing have
not been implemented on a broad scale at any U.S.
airport. Many worry that prior experience with
auctions and congestion pricing in other situations
is not especially useful because of the unique-
ness and complexity of the airline industry and
its networks. Given the fragile financial situations
of many airlines, the implementation of an ill-
designed scheme could be harmful to travelers,
airlines, and other stakeholders, such as the New
York City region. One specific area of concern
for such harm relates to the fact that both the air-
lines and the Port Authority have much debt and
other financing tied to service levels.51 Changes
to the service levels could lead to economic
trauma.52
The preceding discussion leads naturally to
the fact that the implementation of a congestion
pricing or auction mechanism would entail tran-
sition costs. Obviously, the extent of these costs
depends on the actual mechanism selected. The
new situation could have a major impact on sched-
uling practices and require new investment to
manage the new mechanism. Nonetheless, it is
expected that these costs would prove minor
and be offset over time by the gains in economic
efficiency.
Given that the decision to use auctions is a
political as well as an economic decision, the
following question immediately comes to mind:
Would there be so many exemptions to deal with
these concerns that the use of an auction would do
little to increase economic efficiency? Increased
exemptions means higher prices for those not
receiving exemptions and quite possibly those trav-
elers would see few benefits in the form of oper-
ational efficiency or overall system performance.
The existing system does not generate an
efficient use of resources and, as a result, there is
overuse and excessive costs during peak hours.
While the partial elimination of service is a pos-
sibility, air carriers have other possibilities that
might be viable, such as flying at different (non-
peak) times and using other airports, such as
reliever airports for some flights.53 A key point
involving auctions is that the market mechanism
provides incentives to use existing resources
more efficiently.
Cohen, Coughlin, Ott
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2009 583
50 Many ideas in this section were identified by Working Group 2 in
New York Aviation Rulemaking Committee Report, December 13,
2007. Also, for a more detailed discussion of institutional issues
related to slot auctions, see Levine (2009).
51 A related issue concerns the “harm” for certain travelers. Without
question, the use of auction pricing would cause some price changes
and service changes. The monetary cost to travelers during the peak
hours in the New York City area would likely rise and reduce gen-
eral aviation access at those times; however, the nonmonetary costs
of delays and congestion should decline. Some travelers would
likely be harmed by higher airfares and reduced flight options,
particularly those flying to small communities. Mid-size markets
might also lose service. These markets demand high-frequency
service that is provided by regional jets. Without exemptions from 
congestion fees or auction prices, service to some or all of these
communities would be reduced. But Whalen et al. (2007) stress that
the elimination of what are termed “carve-outs” for corporate jets
and general aviation users is a key aspect of their auction proposal.
52 A poorly implemented plan could damage the industry. In a com-
ment on the proposal to auction slots at LaGuardia Airport, the
Federal Trade Commission (2008) specifically highlighted auctions
involving electricity markets in California as a fundamental factor
in the market meltdown. The issue is the likelihood of a poorly
designed and implemented plan. This is possible; however, if
done well, then the reduction of congestion costs should increase
system reliability and provide savings related to time costs for
consumers.
53 In the present case, PANYNJ has purchased a lease for Stewart
Airport (in New Windsor, New York, 60 miles north of New York
City) as a reliever airport.While auctions focus on the efficient use of
slots, the allocation of slots also has important
implications for the use of gates, hangars, and
other physical assets. An airline that loses slots
might incur losses due to declines in value on
these other assets. Moreover, there is no clear
mechanism whereby the winners of the slots can
acquire access to these other complementary assets
controlled by the losers. A longer-run possibility
is that an airline might be less willing to make or
support infrastructure investments in the future.
With the advent of auctions and congestion pric-
ing, the New York market is likely to be viewed
as riskier and thus investment by airlines might
be deterred. This complexity might be difficult
to resolve without a higher governmental author-
ity; yet, there would be incentives to reach mutu-
ally beneficial agreements. A secondary market
for these other assets would likely resolve some
of these concerns.54,55
Another set of concerns revolves around the
fact that the U.S. airline industry operates in an
international environment and is subject to inter-
national rules. For example, international routes
are heavily dependent on connecting flights for
domestic passengers, so anything that affects the
connecting flights (times, frequencies, and so
on) might make the related international flight
unprofitable.56
A second international-related concern is
whether foreign carriers would also be subject
to congestion pricing or auctions. On efficiency
grounds, all carriers should be subject to the same
rules. As suggested previously in the context of
an exemption granted to a specific U.S. carrier,
any exemption of foreign carriers would put U.S.
carriers at a disadvantage.57
Lastly, auction and congestion pricing schemes
might violate U.S. bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments, such as the U.S.–European Union Open
Skies Agreement, because such charges are not
cost based. The charges might be viewed as
exceeding the full cost of providing the relevant
air traffic control or airport services. From an
economist’s view, congestion is a true cost. Thus,
from a theoretical perspective of an economist
the schemes might not violate the law, but that
does not mean the courts would agree.
So far, most discussion in this section has
focused on winners and losers. In their comment
on the proposal regarding LaGuardia, the ATA and
their consultant argued for modifying the proposal
in a way they felt would remove both complexity
and uncertainty while retaining the benefits.58
They argued that the proposed rule for LaGuardia
could be separated into two distinct components,
a cap of takeoffs and landings and an allocation
of the slot rights. Recall from our earlier discus-
sion that assuming certain conditions, it was pos-
sible an efficient outcome could result regardless
of the initial distribution of slot rights. With an
active secondary market, it would be possible
that trading of slot rights would lead to an effi-
cient outcome.
While the FAA’s imposition of hourly opera-
tional caps as a means of congestion management
has faced little resistance, their decision to with-
draw slots from current holders and auction them
has been opposed by most legacy airlines, several
54 A related concern is that implementing auctions and congestion
pricing would reduce the incentive to increase capacity; however,
the inefficient use of resources does not provide the justification
for expansion. Furthermore, auctions would generate revenue that
could be used for justified expansions. 
55 A concern that competitive pressures in the industry may be
reduced stems from the possibility that such pricing would increase
the entry barriers in the airline industry and thus protect legacy
air carriers at the expense of smaller carriers and new entrants.
Legacy air carriers also have access to resources to buy slots. On
the other hand, the inefficiency of current operations should be
weighed against these potential implications of, as well as the
benefits from, market-based pricing.
56 International flight times are somewhat inflexible, so the profitabil-
ity of these flights would decline. There is a narrow time window
both to leave New York for Europe and to leave Europe for New
York to arrive on the same day because of European airports’ slot
rules and the North Atlantic Air Traffic Control system.
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57 Even if foreign carriers would be subject to congestion pricing or
auctions, congestion pricing or auctions might have a large effect
on domestic operations relative to international operations. Foreign
carriers with primarily international operations at New York City
area airports might endure the higher costs because international
flights tend to generate more revenue per passenger than domestic
flights. This would benefit foreign carriers relative to domestic
carriers because they operate hubs in their home countries and
would not be affected by the reduction of U.S. domestic feeder
flights. Obviously, U.S. carriers would be adversely affected by
the reduced number of such flights.
58 See the comments of the ATA and Kasper and Lee (2009) before
the FAA.industry trade organizations, and various govern-
ment entities.59,60
Not surprisingly, the FAA does not view the
New York City market as generating an efficient
allocation of slots. The FAA’s concern is that the
carriers serving LaGuardia have used some of
their existing slots to deny their competitors
access to the slots. To minimize the costs of this
“babysitting” of the slots, the carriers use very
small aircraft. If so, then there is unmet passenger
demand at LaGuardia. This has prompted the FAA
to encourage carriers to increase the average size
of aircraft at the airport. Moreover, the ATA points
to measures of concentration that indicate that
LaGuardia is not dominated by a small number
of carriers.61
In summary, the ATA believes that the FAA
is attempting to solve a problem—a lack of com-
petition that has caused consumer demand to be
unmet—that does not exist. Thus, the auction
and the related regulations are simply imposing
costs on airlines operating at LaGuardia with no
compensating gains.
On the contrary, the FAA views the totality
of its proposal as necessary to generate an efficient
and dynamically competitive environment not
only at LaGuardia, but also at Kennedy and
Newark. It views the slot auctions as primarily a
long-run congestion management tool. Requiring
established airlines to surrender a percentage of
their slots would allow the FAA to increase com-
petition inside the airports by providing new and
limited carriers the ability to expand their opera-
tions. Without a forcible slot reallocation, the FAA
argues, established airlines would have little
incentive to ever voluntarily offer slots for sale
or lease to potential competitors.62,63
CONCLUSION
Airport congestion continues as a major prob-
lem at many airports, including the three major
airports in the New York City area. Economic
theory suggests that this problem might be resolved
via a quantity-based mechanism that includes a
cap on the slots and a market-based allocation of
the slots. However, determining the number of
slots that yields an efficient level of congestion
is a challenging task. In the present case, the FAA
proposed an auction to sell a number of the slots.
As with many public policy proposals, “the devil
is in the details.”
We have provided an extensive discussion
of the proposal. Not surprisingly, many of the
opponents believed they would be harmed by
the proposed changes. Paying higher prices and/or
incurring reductions in air transportation services
are consequences that, not surprisingly, generate
opposition from those likely to be harmed. Many
of these opponents are able to avoid paying the
full cost for their contributions to congestion. We
have also conveyed the key features of the com-
binatorial auction that would be used to allocate
slots. Without question, the FAA’s plan to allocate
some slots via an auction is more complex than
the current system.
Although there is general agreement that a
cap on the number of slots is appropriate, the use
of the auction to allocate the slots has generated
much controversy. The FAA viewed the auction
as an essential feature of their plan, but auction
opponents argued that it would have been unnec-
essary to ensure a competitive result. Moreover,
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59 One argument against the forcible slot reallocations is that the sig-
nificant reduction in airport congestion intended by the final rules
would result mainly from the hourly caps and not the application
of auction proceeds realized from auctioning a marginal number
of slots.
60 While we cannot detail all objections here, they are well described
in the FAA’s final rule documents (Federal Register, 2008a,b).
61 Based on one measure of concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, LaGuardia ranked 34th of 40 airports with the largest number
of domestic origin and destination passengers for the year ending
June 2006. Even this ranking may tend to be overstated because of
the consumer option to use other New York City area airports. See
the comments of the ATA and Kasper and Lee (2009).
62 While in the past airlines have been able to reallocate slots among
themselves via the buy/sell rule, new and limited carriers have
complained that, due to the lack of transparency requirements,
established carriers could effectively shut them out of the market
by arranging private transactions with other carriers, refusing to
sell slots, or refusing to provide meaningful lease terms.
63 Even though the overall number of slots available at each auction
may be small relative to the total daily slot operations at each air-
port, given that the FAA intends to auction slots available during
each peak operating hour, the awarding of even a small number of
them will begin to establish the dollar value associated with the
right to take off or land within a particular window of time. More  -
over, once a monetary value is placed on a slot, it may be more
difficult for established airlines to justify keeping those slots whose
current best benefit is to keep competition at bay at the expense
of clogging up the system.and especially disconcerting to some airlines,
the value capture feature of the proposed auctions
would have required payments by airlines to the
FAA for some slots that they previously received
free of charge. Clearly, these opponents were not
mollified by either the plan to use these proceeds
for projects to mitigate delay and congestion or
that auctions might be the least costly way of
generating such funding. Without an auction,
the FAA believed that the already-established
carriers would have an unfair advantage. On the
other hand, the opponents argue that these carriers
are using the existing slots efficiently and that
the existing secondary market works to ensure
that slots are transferred to those airlines placing
the highest values on the slots.
As of now, the opponents of using an auction
to allocate slots have won the political battle.
Whether a similar proposal will resurface and
generate sufficient political support remains to
be seen.64
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